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Practical quantum oblivious transfer with a single photon
Guang Ping He∗
School of Physics, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China
Quantum oblivious transfer (QOT) is an essential cryptographic primitive. But unconditionally
secure QOT is known to be impossible. Here we propose a practical QOT protocol, which is per-
fectly secure against dishonest sender without relying on any technological assumption. Meanwhile,
it is also secure against dishonest receiver in the absence of long-term quantum memory and compli-
cated collective measurements. The protocol is extremely feasible, as it can be implemented using
currently available Mach-Zehnder interferometer, and no quantum memory, collective measurements
nor entanglement are needed for honest participants. More importantly, comparing with other prac-
tical QOT schemes, our protocol has an unbeatable efficiency since it requires the transmission of a
single photon only.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Mn, 89.70.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
Oblivious transfer (OT) is an important concept in
cryptography, with many variations. The original ver-
sion, a.k.a. all-or-nothing OT, was introduced by Rabin
in 1981 [1]. Shortly after, Even, Goldreich and Lempel
proposed 1-out-of-2 OT [2]. Later it was proven that OT
is an essential building block for two-party and multi-
party protocols [3]. Unfortunately, unconditionally se-
cure OT (whose security is guaranteed solely by the fun-
damental laws of physics) was proven impossible [4–10].
Even OT built-upon secure relativistic bit commitment
[11–14] is covered too [15].
To circumvent the problem, many practically secure
quantum OT (QOT) were proposed, whose security re-
lies on the assumption that the adversary is limited to
some technological constraints, e.g., noisy quantum stor-
age (where the quantum memory is subjected to a cer-
tain level of imperfection) [16–23] or bounded quantum
storage (where the amount of quantum data that can
be stored is limited by some constants) [24, 25]. But to
transfer a single classical bit obliviously, these protocols
have to involve the transmission of thousands of qubits
to reach a satisfactory level of security. Consequently, if
they are used for building more complicated multi-party
secure computation protocols [3] which may call for many
rounds of QOT, then the total number of transmitted
qubits will be tremendous, making the resultant proto-
cols lose the sense of being “practical”.
Here we will propose a QOT protocol, in which only the
transmission of a single photon is required. For dishon-
est sender, our protocol is not only unconditionally se-
cure (i.e., the cheating probability can be made arbitrar-
ily close to 0 as long as the fundamental laws of physics
hold), but also perfectly secure (the sender’s cheating
probability equal to 0 exactly). Meanwhile, it is practi-
cally secure against dishonest receiver as long as he does
∗Electronic address: hegp@mail.sysu.edu.cn
not have long-term quantum memory and cannot per-
form complicated collective measurements.
Such a requirement on quantum memory is much the
same to the above noisy-storage model, except that we
explicitly require that the imperfection of the storage de-
vices should reach the extent that after a certain period
of time, the final state in the quantum memory should no
longer contain any information about the original state
that it initially stored. This can easily be met nowa-
days, because in practice, due to the unavoidable noise
from the environment, no quantum memory can store a
quantum state free from error forever. With the help of
quantum correction code, the lifetime of the state can be
extended. But implementing quantum correction code
is still hard for currently available technology. Thus our
protocol will be useful today and in the foreseen future.
II. DEFINITIONS
We will focus only on all-or-nothing OT below, so we
simply call it OT. As defined in [3], OT is a cryptographic
task between sender Alice and receiver Bob, with the
following properties.
OT:
(I) Alice has a secret bit b.
(II) At the end of the protocol, one of the following
events occurs, each with probability 1/2: (1) Bob learns
the value of b. (2) Bob gains no information about b.
(III) Bob knows which of these two events actually
occurred.
(IV) Alice learns nothing about whether Bob got b or
not.
From these definitions we can see that the goal of dis-
honest Alice is to learn what happens at Bob’s side, while
dishonest Bob wants to increase his probability of getting
b. Let P ∗Alice denote the probability that Alice knows
whether Bob got b or not. Note that even if the proto-
col tells Alice nothing about what happens to Bob, she
can still make a random guess, which can be correct with
2probability 1/2, i.e., there is P ∗Alice = 1/2 even in the
honest case. Thus, Alice’s successful cheating prob-
ability v should be defined as
v ≡ P ∗Alice −
1
2
. (1)
Note that forcing Alice to commit to a specific value
of b is not the duty of OT. If she conceives the value of b
in her mind while her actual actions in the protocol lead
Bob to another irrelevant bit b˜, then we should take b˜ as
the actual b value that Alice inputs to the protocol in-
stead. This should not be considered as cheating, as long
as it does not increase Alice’s probability v on knowing
whether Bob got b or not.
When studying Bob’s cheating, we should note that
Bob can choose to either get b unambiguously (i.e., he
knows with certainty whether the value he got is correct
or not) or ambiguously (i.e., his obtained value matches
b with a considerable probability, but he does not known
exactly whether it is correct or not). Let b′ denote what
Bob obtained from the protocol, we can define the reli-
ability R of b′ as the probability for b′ = b. When Bob
gets b ambiguously (unambiguously), there is R < 100%
(R = 100%).
Let P ∗Bob denote the probability that Bob gets b with
reliability R = 100%. Then the goal of secure OT is
to ensure P ∗Bob = 1/2. Therefore, it is natural to define
Bob’s successful cheating probability u as
u ≡ P ∗Bob −
1
2
. (2)
Nevertheless, when Bob knows unambiguously that he
fails to get b, he can still make a guess, which can be
correct with probability 1/2, i.e., R = 50%. Thus we
should note that the average reliability that Bob obtains
in secure OT is not required to be equal to 1/2. Instead,
it should be
R¯ =
1
2
× 100%+ 1
2
× 50% = 75%. (3)
III. OUR PROTOCOL
As mentioned in the introduction, in practice any
quantum memory has a limited storage time. Let T de-
note the upperbound of the storage time of state-of-the-
art quantum memory (even when quantum correction is
taken into account), such that after time T , we can be
sure that it is no longer possible to gain any informa-
tion of the state initially stored in the memory. With
this consideration, we propose a practical QOT proto-
col, whose experimental apparatus is illustrated in Fig.1.
Let τA (τB) denote the delay time that Alice (Bob) intro-
duced using ODA (ODB), and θA (θB) be the phase shift
angle produced by PSA (PSB). For simplicity, suppose
that except for ODA and ODB , the time for the photon
to travel through all other devices in Fig.1 is negligible.
Our protocol is as follows.
Protocol QOT: (for transferring a bit b ∈ {0, 1} from
Alice to Bob)
(i) Alice and Bob agree on the times t1 and t2 which
mark the beginning and the end of the transmission, and
a fixed delay time value ∆≪ t2 − t1.
(ii) Bob randomly picks the delay time τB ∈ {0,∆}
and the phase shift angle θB ∈ {0, pi}, and sets the op-
tical delay ODB and the phase shifter PSB accordingly.
He keeps them in these settings during the entire time
interval [t1, t2].
(iii) Alice picks the delay time τA ∈ {0,∆} randomly,
and takes the phase shift angle
θA = bpi (4)
where b ∈ {0, 1} is the secret bit that she wants to trans-
fer, then sets ODA and PSA accordingly. She also picks a
secret time ts ∈ [t1, t2−∆] randomly, and sends a photon
from the source S at ts.
(iv) When Bob finds his detector Di (i ∈ {0, 1}) clicks,
he records the index i. Note that if he detects more
than one click or no click at all within [t1, t2], he should
conclude that Alice cheats.
(v) After time t2 + T , Alice announces τA to Bob.
(v) If Bob finds τA 6= τB , he concludes that he fail to
get b. Or if τA = τB, he concludes that
b = i⊕ (θB/pi). (5)
IV. CORRECTNESS
Correctness means that if both parties are honest,
then the goal of OT can be reached. In our protocol,
when using the second quantization formalism, we can
use |t〉A |0〉B to denote that there is a photon on path A
at time t and no photon on path B, and use |0〉A |t〉B to
denote that there is a photon on path B at time t and
no photon on path A. Then the initial state of Alice’s
photon after passing BSA is
|ψ〉in =
1√
2
(|ts〉A |0〉B + |0〉A |ts〉B). (6)
After passing ODA, PSA, ODB and PSB, the final state
of the photon arriving at BSB is
|ψ〉f =
1√
2
(eiθA |ts + τA〉A |0〉B + eiθB |0〉A |ts + τB〉B).
(7)
Meanwhile, when combining with BSB , D0 and D1
serve as the projective operators
P0 ≡ |ψ〉0 〈ψ|0 (8)
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FIG. 1: Diagram of our OT protocol. Alice sends a single photon from the source S to the beam splitter BSA, which is a
half-silvered mirror that will either reflect the photon into path A or transmit it into path B with equal probabilities. On path
A (B), the photon is reflected by the mirror MA (MB) so that it is redirected to another half-reflected and half-transmitted
beam splitter BSB after passing the optical delay ODA (ODB) and the phase shifter PSA (PSB), then reaches either the
detector D0 or D1. When ODA and ODB are set to produce the same delay time, the total length of paths A and B are equal,
so that the complete apparatus acts as a balanced Mach-Zehnder interferometer.
and
P1 ≡ |ψ〉1 〈ψ|1 , (9)
respectively, where
|ψ〉
0
≡ 1√
2
(|t〉A |0〉B + |0〉A |t〉B), (10)
and
|ψ〉
1
≡ 1√
2
(|t〉A |0〉B − |0〉A |t〉B). (11)
Since τA, τB ∈ {0,∆}, with probability 1/2 there is
τA = τB . Then if θA = θB, Eq.(7) becomes
|ψ〉f = eiθA
1√
2
(|ts + τA〉A |0〉B + |0〉A |ts + τA〉B), (12)
so that the photon will be detected by D0 at time ts+τA
with certainty. Or if |θA − θB | = pi, then
|ψ〉f = eiθA
1√
2
(|ts + τA〉A |0〉B − |0〉A |ts + τA〉B), (13)
so that the photon will be detected by D1 at time ts+τA
with certainty. That is, in either case the detector Di
will click, where
i = (θA/pi)⊕ (θB/pi). (14)
Combining with Eq.(4), we can see that the value of b
that Bob obtained from Eq.(5) is correct.
On the other hand, with probability 1/2 there will be
τA 6= τB. Then Eq.(7) indicates that the state of the
photon arrived at BSB at time ts + τA (or ts + τB) has
the form |ts + τA〉A |0〉B (or |0〉A |ts + τB〉B). Applying
Eqs.(8) and (9) on them, we know that D0 and D1 could
click with equal probabilities at either time ts + τA or
ts+τB . Therefore, unlike Eq.(14), now the index i of the
detector Di that clicks contains no information on the
relationship between θA and θB, so that Bob fails to get
b.
Thus we proved that when both parties are honest, our
protocol can ensure that with probability 1/2, Bob can
get b with reliability R = 100%.
V. SECURITY AGAINST ALICE
The goal of dishonest Alice is to know whether Bob
got b or not. According to step(v), Bob got b (failed to
get b) if τA = τB (τA 6= τB). Thus, Alice needs to know
Bob’s choice of τB . But a distinct feature of our protocol
is: there is only one-way information transfer from Alice
to Bob, while Bob never announces any classical infor-
mation or transfers any quantum information to Alice.
Thus it is clear that Alice has no method to learn what
happens at Bob’s side. All that she can do is to make
a random guess, which can be correct with probability
P ∗Alice = 1/2. Thus her successful cheating probability is
exactly
v = P ∗Alice −
1
2
= 0. (15)
Therefore, our protocol is perfectly secure against dishon-
est Alice, without relying on any technological assump-
tion.
4VI. SECURITY AGAINST BOB
In principle, if Bob can store the photon unmeasured
until Alice announces τA, then he can always choose
τA = τB and learn b with probability 100%. Thus our
protocol is not unconditionally secure. But in practice,
as we assumed that the maximum storage time of the
state of the photon is T , Bob has to complete the mea-
surement no later then t2 + T . At that time Alice has
not announces τA yet. This forces Bob to make his own
choice of τB without knowing τA. Consequently, it guar-
antees that τA = τB occurs with probability 1/2. When
this indeed occurs, Bob gets b with reliability R = 100%.
Else if τA 6= τB occurs, Bob knows that he fails to get
b. Thus the probability that Bob gets b with reliability
R = 100% is P ∗Bob = 1/2, i.e., his cheating probability is
u = P ∗Bob −
1
2
= 0 (16)
so that our protocol meets the requirement of OT in prac-
tice.
However, there is still a security problem to worry. Let
ρ0 and ρ1 denote the density matrices of the unmeasured
state of the photon entering Bob’s site (before passing
ODB and PSB) corresponding to Alice’s choices b = 0
and b = 1, respectively. As elaborated in the appendix,
they can be written as
ρ0 =
1
2(2n−∆)(
tn∑
ts=t1
((|ts〉A |0〉B + |0〉A |ts〉B)
×(〈ts|A 〈0|B + 〈0|A 〈ts|B))
+
tn−∆∑
ts=t1
((|ts +∆〉A |0〉B + |0〉A |ts〉B)
×(〈ts +∆|A 〈0|B + 〈0|A 〈ts|B))) (17)
and
ρ1 =
1
2(2n−∆)(
tn∑
ts=t1
((− |ts〉A |0〉B + |0〉A |ts〉B)
×(−〈ts|A 〈0|B + 〈0|A 〈ts|B))
+
tn−∆∑
ts=t1
((− |ts +∆〉A |0〉B + |0〉A |ts〉B)
×(−〈ts +∆|A 〈0|B + 〈0|A 〈ts|B))), (18)
where we treat the time interval [t1, t2] as n equally di-
vided time slots, i.e., ts can be chosen as t1, t2, ..., tn,
with n→∞. Then numerical calculation shows that the
trace distance between ρ0 and ρ1 for high n is
D(ρ0, ρ1) ≡ 1
2
tr
√
(ρ0 − ρ1)†(ρ0 − ρ1) ≃ 0.637. (19)
According to Theorem 9.1 of [26], this indicates that
there could be a positive-operator valued measure
(POVM) for Bob, which can discriminate ρ0 and ρ1 (and
thus learn b) unambiguously with probability
p = D(ρ0, ρ1), (20)
or can discriminate ρ0 and ρ1 ambiguously so that Bob
get b with the average reliability
R¯ = (D(ρ0, ρ1) + 1)/2. (21)
Consequently, if Bob can apply this POVM, he can cheat
with probability
u = p− 1/2 ≃ 0.137, (22)
or obtain b with an average reliability
R¯ ≃ 81.9% > 75% (23)
so that our protocol is not a secure OT in principle.
Nevertheless, currently it is unknown whether such a
POVM can be implemented with currently available tech-
nology or not. Especially, Eqs.(17) and (18) show that
ρ0 and ρ1 contain the states from different time ts where
s = 1, 2, ..., n with n→∞. Thus the POVM for discrim-
inating ρ0 and ρ1 is actually a collective measurement
on an infinite number of states potentially being sent
at different time ts. Also, in practice the error rate of
quantum memory increases with time. Then the actual
density matrices ρ0 and ρ1 will then turn into the mixes
of quantum states containing different amount of error.
It makes the POVM for decoding the correct b become
even more complicated. Therefore, before these difficul-
ties could be overcome in the future, our protocol can be
trusted as a secure OT in practice.
VII. DISCUSSIONS
In summary, we propose an OT protocol, which is per-
fectly secure against dishonest Alice, i.e., her probabil-
ity on learning whether Bob got b or not is exactly zero.
Meanwhile, it is practically secure against dishonest Bob,
i.e., his probability for getting b with reliability 100% is
exactly 1/2 as long as he does not have long-term quan-
tum memory nor the POVM for maximally discriminat-
ing ρ0 and ρ1 in Eqs.(17) and (18) without knowing Al-
ice’s delay time τA.
On the feasibility aspect, by comparing our Fig.1 and
that of [27], we can see that the technology in [27] is suf-
ficient for implementing our protocol. Also, honest par-
ticipants do not need quantum memory, collective mea-
surements nor entanglement. Thus it is very feasible.
Comparing with other practical OT protocols using noisy
or bounded storage [16–25], our protocol only needs the
transmission of a single photon. Thus the efficiency is
unbeatable.
In the above analysis, we have not considered the
transmission and detection errors in practice. But since
only one photon is used in our protocol, it is obvious that
the error rate of the final transferred bit b is determined
directly by the error rate in transmission and detection,
which can easily be checked in practice.
5Appendix: The density matrices and trace distance
Here we calculate the density matrices ρ0, ρ1 and trace
distance D(ρ0, ρ1) used in the security proof of our pro-
tocol against dishonest Bob.
After passing ODA and PSA, the state of the photon
that Alice sent to Bob (i.e., |ψ〉in in Eq.(6)) turns into
|ψ〉s =
1√
2
(eiθA |ts + τA〉A |0〉B + |0〉A |ts〉B). (24)
That is, if b = 0, then
|ψ〉s =
1√
2
(|ts + τA〉A |0〉B + |0〉A |ts〉B), (25)
or if b = 1, then
|ψ〉s =
1√
2
(− |ts + τA〉A |0〉B + |0〉A |ts〉B). (26)
Let us treat the time interval [t1, t2] as n equally divided
time slots with n→∞, i.e., ts can be chosen as t1, t2, ...,
tn. Since τA can be either 0 or ∆ with equal probabilities,
the density matrices corresponding to b = 0 and b = 1,
respectively, are
ρ0 =
1
2(2n−∆)(
tn∑
ts=t1
((|ts〉A |0〉B + |0〉A |ts〉B)
×(〈ts|A 〈0|B + 〈0|A 〈ts|B))
+
tn−∆∑
ts=t1
((|ts +∆〉A |0〉B + |0〉A |ts〉B)
×(〈ts +∆|A 〈0|B + 〈0|A 〈ts|B))) (27)
and
ρ1 =
1
2(2n−∆)(
tn∑
ts=t1
((− |ts〉A |0〉B + |0〉A |ts〉B)
×(−〈ts|A 〈0|B + 〈0|A 〈ts|B))
+
tn−∆∑
ts=t1
((− |ts +∆〉A |0〉B + |0〉A |ts〉B)
×(−〈ts +∆|A 〈0|B + 〈0|A 〈ts|B))), (28)
thus Eqs.(17) and (18) in the main text are obtained.
Now let us calculate the trace distance between them.
The above equations give
ρ0 − ρ1 = 1
2n−∆(
tn∑
ts=t1
(|ts〉A |0〉B 〈0|A 〈ts|B
+ |0〉A |ts〉B 〈ts|A 〈0|B)
+
tn−∆∑
ts=t1
(|ts +∆〉A |0〉B 〈0|A 〈ts|B
+ |0〉A |ts〉B 〈ts +∆|A 〈0|B)). (29)
Denote
|s〉 ≡ |ts〉A |0〉B , (30)
|s+ n〉 ≡ |0〉A |ts〉B (31)
for s = 1, ..., n, and take ∆ = 1 for simplicity, then
ρ0 − ρ1 = 1
2n− 1(
n∑
s=1
(|s〉 〈s+ n|+ |s+ n〉 〈s|)
+
n−1∑
s=1
(|s+ 1〉 〈s+ n|+ |s+ n〉 〈s+ 1|)).
(32)
For s = 1, ..., 2n, denote
〈s| = [ 0 ... 0 1 0 ... 0 ] (33)
i.e., only the sth element of the vector at the right-hand
side of the equation is 1, while the rest elements are all
0. Then
ρ0 − ρ1 = 1
2n− 1(
n∑
s=1
([1s,s+n] + [1s+n,s])
+
n−1∑
s=1
([1s+1,s+n] + [1s+n,s+1])), (34)
where [1i,j ] denote a 2n× 2n matrix whose elements are
all 0 except that the element in the i row and j column
is 1. Therefore
ρ0 − ρ1 = 1
2n− 1
×


0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 1 0 0 · · · 0 0 0
0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 1 1 0 · · · 0 0 0
0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 0 1 1 · · · 0 0 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 0 0 0 · · · 1 0 0
0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 0 0 0 · · · 1 1 0
0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 0 0 0 · · · 0 1 1
1 1 0 · · · 0 0 0 0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0
0 1 1 · · · 0 0 0 0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0
0 0 1 · · · 0 0 0 0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
0 0 0 · · · 1 1 0 0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0
0 0 0 · · · 0 1 1 0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0
0 0 0 · · · 0 0 1 0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0


,
(35)
6FIG. 2: The trace distance between the density matrice ρ0
and ρ1 in Eqs.(17) and (18) as a function of the number of
the time slots n.
and we have
(ρ0 − ρ1)†(ρ0 − ρ1) = 1
(2n− 1)2
×


1 1 0 · · · 0 0 0 0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0
1 2 1 · · · 0 0 0 0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0
0 1 2 · · · 0 0 0 0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 · · · 2 1 0 0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0
0 0 0 · · · 1 2 1 0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0
0 0 0 · · · 0 1 2 0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0
0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 2 1 0 · · · 0 0 0
0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 1 2 1 · · · 0 0 0
0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 0 1 2 · · · 0 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 0 0 0 · · · 2 1 0
0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 0 0 0 · · · 1 2 1
0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 0 0 0 · · · 0 1 1


.
(36)
The trace distance between ρ0 and ρ1 is defined as
D(ρ0, ρ1) ≡ 1
2
tr
√
(ρ0 − ρ1)†(ρ0 − ρ1). (37)
Numerical calculation shows that it drops as n increases,
but slows down significantly when n > 50, as shown in
Fig.2. We calculated up to n = 1000, and the result is
D(ρ0, ρ1) ≃ 0.637. (38)
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